William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 1

Article 2

2011

Torts: Striking a Balance: Minnesota's Minority
Stance on the Privilege to Defame—Zutz V.
Nelson, 788 N.w.2d 58 (minn. 2010)
Erica Holzer

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Holzer, Erica (2011) "Torts: Striking a Balance: Minnesota's Minority Stance on the Privilege to Defame—Zutz V. Nelson, 788 N.w.2d
58 (minn. 2010)," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 38: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss1/2

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Holzer: Torts: Striking a Balance: Minnesota's Minority Stance on the Pri

TORTS: STRIKING A BALANCE: MINNESOTA’S
MINORITY STANCE ON THE PRIVILEGE TO DEFAME—
ZUTZ V. NELSON, 788 N.W.2D 58 (MINN. 2010).
Erica Holzer †
I.
II.

III.
IV.

V.

INTRODUCTION...................................................................... 560
HISTORY ................................................................................. 562
A. The Tension Between Uninhibited Political Speech and
Defamation ....................................................................... 563
B. The Origins and Development of Absolute Privilege ............ 565
1. Legislative Privilege ..................................................... 565
2. Judicial Privilege ......................................................... 569
3. Executive Privilege ....................................................... 570
C. Expanding the Scope of Privilege ........................................ 571
D. Minnesota’s Minority Stance ............................................. 572
THE ZUTZ DECISION ............................................................... 575
ANALYSIS OF THE ZUTZ DECISION .......................................... 578
A. The Zutz Rule Strikes a Better Balance Between Competing
Interests ............................................................................ 578
1. Absolute Privilege is Not Appropriate for Subordinate
Government Officials ................................................... 579
2. Subordinate Government Officials Are Sufficiently
Protected by Qualified Privilege ..................................... 581
B. The Zutz Rule Provides Certainty ...................................... 583
CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 585

† J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, May 2013; B.A.,
Psychology, University of Minnesota, 2006. I would like to thank Professors J.
David Prince, Michael K. Steenson, and Mary Patricia Byrn for their invaluable
guidance in writing this Note. I dedicate this Note to my wife, Jane Holzer, for her
unyielding encouragement and support.

559

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 2

560

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

The Purest Treasure mortal times afford
1
Is spotless reputation . . . .

I.

INTRODUCTION

Society has long considered one’s reputation an interest worth
2
At the same time, the law protects an equally
protecting.
3
important interest in free, uninhibited political speech. At the
intersection of these two competing interests lies the doctrine of
privilege: the freedom, enjoyed by certain public officials, under
4
certain circumstances, to defame others with impunity.
Effective democracy is rooted in the principle that “debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
5
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”
Free, uninhibited speech by government officials allows voters to
make informed decisions, influence policy makers, and check
abuse of power by public officials by voting those members out of
6
office. Freedom of speech is also essential for the discovery of
7
truth.
It is thought that any threat of defamation liability will cause
responsible government officials to perform their duties more
8
timidly, thus inhibiting the free flow of ideas we deem essential to
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II, act 1, sc. 1.
2. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:2 (2d ed. 2011). The
pre-thirteenth century remedy for defamation was to cut out the offender’s
tongue. Id. For an overview of the history of defamation law, see generally Van
Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 4 COLUM. L. REV.
33 (1904).
3. See Joel F. Handler & William A. Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation
Suits Against Government Executive Officials, 74 HARV. L. REV. 44, 44 (1960).
4. 30 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST, LIBEL AND SLANDER § 4.00 (2011).
5. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
6. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 926
(3d ed. 2006).
7. See infra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
8. See Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566
F.2d 289, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“The nation’s welfare is dependent upon officials
who are willing to speak forthrightly and disclose violations of the law and other
activities contrary to the public interest. Their voices will be stilled if they perceive
or fear that the person involved has the resources or disposition to defend with all
affirmative tactics. When millions may turn on regulatory decisions, there is a
strong incentive to counterattack.”); see also Comment, Absolute Immunity: Too Broad
a Protection for the “Public Interest”?, 10 STAN. L. REV. 589, 590 (1958) [hereinafter
Absolute Immunity] (“It is further suggested that responsible men will not assume
government office, or will perform their duties timidly, if they are open to
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9

the effective functioning of our democracy. Therefore, certain
government officials are granted the privilege to make defamatory
statements—not in a desire to protect individual government
10
officials for their own benefit, but rather to protect the rights of
11
the people they represent.
The privilege to make defamatory statements is divided into
12
Absolute privilege
two categories: absolute and qualified.
provides immunity to certain government officials, even when
13
statements are knowingly false and expressly malicious. Qualified
privilege provides immunity only upon a showing of good faith and
14
lack of malice. Additionally, qualified privilege is destroyed if the
15
privilege is abused. In determining what type of privilege, if any,
to apply, courts must examine the consequences and benefits of
limiting speech by certain government officials. According to
Judge Learned Hand, “As is so often the case, the answer must be
personal liability for acts within the scope of their authority.”).
9. Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc., 566 F.2d at 293.
10. Léon R. Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional Speech—Its Origin,
Meaning and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 960, 968 (1951) (quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4
Mass. 1, 27 (1808)), available at http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments
/scr/treatise/immunity/99%20U.%20Pa.%20L.%20Rev.%20960%20(1951).pdf
(explaining that instead of being secured for personal benefit, these privileges are
secured to support the rights of the people by enabling their representatives to
work without fear of civil or criminal prosecution); see also Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564, 572–73 (1959) (“The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office,
but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of
government.”).
11. See infra note 56.
12. Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 416 (1954).
13. Id.
14. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 180–183.
15. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 115,
at 832 (5th ed. 1984) (“[Qualified] immunity is forfeited if the defendant steps
outside of the scope of the privilege, or abuses the occasion.”); see also Matthis, 243
Minn. at 223, 67 N.W.2d at 416 (“[A] qualified or conditional privilege grants
immunity only if the privilege is not abused and defamatory statements are
publicized in good faith and without malice.”). The Restatement (Second) of
Torts provides four ways qualified privilege may be abused:
[1] because of the publisher’s knowledge or reckless disregard as to the
falsity of the defamatory matter; [2] because the defamatory matter is
published for some purpose other than that for which the particular
privilege is given; [3] because the publication is made to some person
not reasonably believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose of the particular privilege; or [4] because the publication
includes defamatory matter not reasonably believed to be necessary to
accomplish the purpose for which the occasion is privileged.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 599 cmt. a (1977) (citations omitted).
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found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either
16
alternative.”
Because absolute privilege comes at the cost of denying relief
17
to victims of intentionally malicious defamatory statements,
absolute privilege was historically limited to members of the U.S.
18
Congress and the highest legislative bodies of a state. In the last
thirty years, however, a growing trend has evolved in favor of
19
expanding absolute privilege to subordinate government officials.
During this period, Minnesota has consistently declined to adopt
20
this broad application of privilege.
21
Recently, in Zutz v. Nelson, the Minnesota Supreme Court was
faced with the decision to maintain its minority stance or join the
growing majority. Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court
declined to adopt the majority position on the issue, holding that
qualified, rather than absolute, privilege is appropriate for
22
subordinate government officials.
This case note first outlines the origins and development of
23
absolute privilege. It then details the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
24
25
holding in Zutz, followed by an analysis of the decision. Finally,
the note concludes by asserting that the Minnesota Supreme Court
continues to strike the right balance between two important,
competing public interests by maintaining its minority stance on
26
privilege.
II. HISTORY
This Part first discusses the tension between the two competing
policies of free, uninhibited political speech, and providing a
16. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 162–166.
18. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. c (1938).
19. See Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Minn. 2010) (Anderson, Paul H.,
J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. c (1977); cf.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. c (1938) (reflecting the majority rule of
that era).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. C, reporter’s note (1977)
(listing Minnesota among jurisdictions not extending absolute privilege to
subordinate legislative bodies).
21. 788 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 2010).
22. Id. at 63.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra Part V.
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remedy for the tort of defamation. It then traces the origins of
absolute privilege, how that privilege has expanded across various
jurisdictions, and Minnesota’s minority stance on the issue.
A. The Tension Between Uninhibited Political Speech and Defamation
The drafters of the U.S. Constitution established a legacy of
condemning the practice of prosecuting individuals for speech,
especially speech that is critical of government or government
27
However, absolute freedom of speech for everyone,
officials.
28
under all circumstances, is simply untenable. Courts must make
value judgments as to what speech is protected, under what
circumstances, and when and how the government can regulate
29
speech. Informing these judgments are the underlying goals of
free speech: furthering self-governance and aiding the discovery of
30
truth via the “marketplace of ideas.”
Political speech is at the core of what is protected by the U.S.
31
Constitution. Effective self-governance is rooted in the principle
that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
32
Freedom of speech allows voters to make informed
officials.”
decisions, influence policy makers, and check abuse of power by
33
public officials by voting those members out of office.
Freedom of speech is also thought to be essential for the
discovery of truth. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued, “[T]he
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
34
in the competition of the market . . . .” The notion behind this
so-called “marketplace of ideas” metaphor is that the remedy for
35
false speech is “more speech, not enforced silence.” There is much
27. See William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of
Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 113–14 (1984).
28. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 925.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 926.
31. Id. at 927; see also Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215–17 (2011)
(discussing what constitutes political speech); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 273–74 (1964) (stating, in obiter dictum, that the “central meaning of the
First Amendment” is to allow criticism of government and government officials).
32. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270.
33. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 926.
34. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
35. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
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flawed about this metaphor—namely, that it erroneously
presupposes that everyone is equal and that access to the
36
ideological marketplace is free from imposed boundaries. But,
giving government the power to decide what is true and right—and
37
the power to suppress all else—would be much worse. Therefore,
until a better method is introduced, free speech is the best way to
38
discover the truth. Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in
Whitney v. California, offers a compelling explanation for protecting
freedom of speech:
Those who won our independence believed . . . that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should
be a fundamental principle of the American government.
They recognized the risks to which all human institutions
are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured
merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that
it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression
breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that
the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely
supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the
fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in
the power of reason as applied through public discussion,
they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of
force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional
tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the
Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be
39
guaranteed.
However, alongside these benefits, free speech has the potential to
cause devastating consequences. Victims of defamatory speech, for
40
example, are subject to hatred, ridicule, obloquy, and contempt.
Defamatory speech is a published, false statement that
disparages another by reflecting unfavorably upon his personal
morality or integrity, or discrediting his financial standing in the
concurring) (emphasis added).
36. For an extraordinary critique of the marketplace of ideas metaphor
through the lens of white privilege and racism, see generally Cedric Merlin Powell,
The Mythological Marketplace of Ideas: R.A.V., Mitchell, and Beyond, 12 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 1 (1995).
37. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 926.
38. See id. at 928–29 (citing MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
1–12 (1984)).
39. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375–76.
40. DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE § 1:7 (2010).
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41

community.
Defamation necessarily involves the element of
42
Therefore, while calling someone a Republican may
disgrace.
arouse adverse feelings toward him by Democrats, and even
diminish him in their esteem, it lacks the necessary element of
43
personal disgrace to be considered defamation.
The law provides a remedy for the very real damage caused by
44
The interest in protecting one’s
false, defamatory statements.
reputation against the personally crushing and career-ending
potential of defamatory speech provides one occasion to place
45
limits on free, uninhibited speech. As long as the law protects
both reputational interests and free speech interests, there will be a
46
perpetual balancing of these two competing policies.
B. The Origins and Development of Absolute Privilege
Absolute privilege is granted to various officials in all three
branches of government. The Middle Snake Watershed District
Board at issue in Zutz falls under the legislative branch. As such,
this Part focuses on absolute privilege in the legislative branch,
followed by a brief discussion of absolute privilege in the judicial
and executive branches.
1.

Legislative Privilege

Members of the U.S. Congress enjoy the absolute privilege of
47
This privilege is fundamental to our
free, uninhibited speech.
48
democratic system of government. Officially originating in the
49
Parliament of England in 1688, absolute privilege was established
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 559 cmt. b (1977).
42. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 111, at 773.
43. Id. Nor is it defamatory to impute to someone perfectly legitimate
conduct in which one is entitled to engage. ELDER, supra note 40, § 1:7. Thus, it is
not defamatory to state that a city council member played golf with a developer,
Riley v. Moyed, 529 A.2d 248, 253 (Del. 1987), or that a plaintiff declined to be
interviewed by the media, Brewer v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 986 S.W.2d 636, 643
(Tex. App. 1998), or that a legislator voted otherwise than he had on expenditures
and taxes, Tatur v. Solsrud, 498 N.W.2d 232, 234–35 (Wis. 1993).
44. See Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Minn. 2010).
45. See SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 1:21.
46. See id. (pointing out the constant trade-offs between free expression and
reputation).
47. Yankwich, supra note 10, at 961–62.
48. Id.
49. It is unclear exactly when legislative immunity for parliamentary speech
was officially granted in England. See id. at 962–64. Until what the English call
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to maintain an independent legislative branch of government, free
50
from the prerogatives of the King. Similarly, the drafters of the
U.S. Constitution recognized the value of an independent
legislative branch and thus ratified what is referred to as the speech
or debate clause:
[Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases,
except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be
privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the
Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in
either House, they shall not be questioned in any other
51
Place.
Every state has affirmed this principle by including provisions
52
similar to the speech or debate clause in their state constitutions.
In so doing, state senators and representatives enjoy absolute
privilege, just like members of Congress, to make defamatory
53
For example, the Minnesota
statements with impunity.
Constitution provides, “For any speech or debate in either house
[members of each house] shall not be questioned in any other
54
place.”
The justification for absolute legislative privilege lies not in a

“the glorious Revolution” in 1688, any privilege to speak with impunity was
considered an act of grace by the King. Id. at 963. At the beginning of every
session of Parliament, the Speaker of the House of Commons requested the right
to speak with impunity, along with other rights (such as access to the King), which
the King granted. Id. Section 19 of the Bill of Rights, granted by William and
Mary, stated, “That the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in
Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of
Parliament.” Id. at 964.
50. Yankwich, supra note 10, at 962. During the reign of Queen Elizabeth I,
members of the House of Commons who attempted to discuss matters in
Parliament distasteful to the crown often found themselves confined to the Tower
of London. Comment, Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
125, 126 (1973).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
52. Yankwich, supra note 10, at 965; see, e.g., MASS. CONST., Declaration of
Rights, art. XXI (“The freedom of deliberation, speech and debate, in either
house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be
the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or complaint, in any other
court or place whatsoever.”). Interestingly, in Hawaii, state legislators enjoy a
greater privilege than the privilege granted to Congress by the U.S. Constitution.
See Abercrombie v. McClung, 525 P.2d 594, 597 (Haw. 1974) (holding that a state
legislator was privileged for statements made outside the legislative process).
53. ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 8:2.2 (4th ed. 2011).
54. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
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desire to protect individual legislators for their own benefit. But
rather, by enabling legislators to conduct the functions of their
56
office without fear, the rights of the people are protected.
The notion that “the public” is protected when legislators are
given absolute privilege to make maliciously false defamatory
statements is supported by two main arguments. First, in order to
govern effectively, officials must be able to devote their full time
and attention to the responsibilities of their office without being
57
tied up in litigation. Any litigation arising out of the performance
of official duties impairs officials from performing duties that are of
58
importance to the public.
Next, it is suggested that any threat of liability for actions taken
within the scope of their authority will cause responsible
59
government officials to perform their duties more timidly. If a
legislator is inhibited from freely disclosing facts, it limits the
60
public’s access to the truth. And, as discussed above, it is access to
the truth which ensures the functioning of our democracy by
allowing voters to make informed decisions, influence policy
makers, and check abuse of power by public officials by voting

55. Yankwich, supra note 10, at 968 (quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27
(1808)); see also Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572–73 (1959) (“The privilege is not
a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to
aid in the effective functioning of government.”).
56. James Wilson, one of the principal architects of the federal Constitution’s
speech or debate clause, stated:
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick [sic] to
discharge his publick [sic] trust with firmness and success, it is
indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech,
and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one,
however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion
offence.
1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 421 (R. McCloskey ed., 1967), cited in Richard D.
Batchelder, Jr., Chastain v. Sundquist: A Narrow Reading of the Doctrine of Legislative
Immunity, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 384, 386 (1990).
57. Developments in the Law, Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 918 (1956).
58. Absolute Immunity, supra note 8, at 590; Defamation, supra note 57, at 918.
59. See Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566
F.2d 289, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“The nation’s welfare is dependent upon officials
who are willing to speak forthrightly and disclose violations of the law and other
activities contrary to the public interest. Their voices will be stilled if they perceive
or fear that the person involved has the resources or disposition to defend with all
affirmative tactics. When millions may turn on regulatory decisions, there is a
strong incentive to counterattack.”); see also Absolute Immunity, supra note 8, at 590
(detailing the policy arguments for and against this broad immunity).
60. Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc., 566 F.2d at 293.
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61

those members out of office.
62
This privilege for legislators to speak and debate is absolute.
This means that even when statements are knowingly false and
63
expressly malicious, no liability can be imposed. That being said,
it is not difficult to imagine the injustice that abuse of this privilege
64
makes possible. Presumably, the drafters of the U.S. Constitution
were aware of the abuses that could flow from safeguards that are
65
too sweeping. However, the public benefits derived from open
communication by Congress were, and are, thought to be sufficient
to outweigh the policy in favor of compensating victims of
66
defamation.
In an attempt to curb abuses, however, the scope of absolute
legislative privilege has generally remained limited to actions that
67
are related to law making and the legislative process itself.
Accordingly, the test when determining whether the speech or
debate clause applies is whether or not the activity qualifies as a
68
“legislative act.”
To illustrate, in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, Senator Proxmire made
allegedly defamatory statements about Richard Hutchinson’s

61. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
62. Yankwich, supra note 10, at 967.
63. Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 416–17 (1954).
64. See Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, supra note 50, at 127 (offering
an in−depth analysis of legislative immunity); Yankwich, supra note 10, at 973
(referring to possible abuse of privileges).
65. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 517 (1972).
66. Absolute Immunity, supra note 8, at 589–90; see also Van Vechten Veeder,
Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 463, 467
(1909) (“Any principle that is universal in its application may sometimes be harsh
in its consequences. But where the reasons on which it is based are plain and
unmistakable, individual interest must yield to the commanding dictates of public
policy.”).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. a (1977) (“The privilege
does not protect a legislator who in private or public discussion outside of his
legislative function explains his reasons for voting on past, pending or proposed
legislation or who otherwise discusses the legislation, or who engages in other
activities incidentally related to legislative affairs but not a part of the legislative
process itself.”); see also Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(“The Speech or Debate Clause protects all lawmaking activities undertaken in the
House and Senate, but affords no constitutional immunity beyond its carefully
defined scope.”).
68. See Michael R. Seghetti, Speech or Debate Immunity: Preserving Legislative
Independence While Cutting Costs of Congressional Immunity, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
589, 594 (1985) (pointing out that courts generally have not extended protection
to the conduct of congressmen beyond the walls of Congress).
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69

research in a newsletter.
Proxmire argued that informing his
constituents was an essential part of his duties as a member of
Congress and that this communication, therefore, should be
70
71
protected. The Court disagreed. While Proxmire’s statements
would have been protected if made in the Senate, they were not
protected in the context of published newsletters or press
72
releases. Private publication of defamatory matter is simply not
“essential to the deliberations of the Senate,” nor is it a part of the
73
deliberative process.
The Court in Proxmire concluded that the drafters of the U.S.
Constitution did not make a conscious choice to grant immunity
for “defamatory statements scattered far and wide by mail, press,
74
Thus, absolute privilege was not
and the electronic media.”
extended to activities that merely relate to the legislative process.
2.

Judicial Privilege

The U.S. Supreme Court extended absolute privilege to judges
75
in 1871. The policy of granting judicial privilege is rooted in a
nearly identical philosophy to that of granting legislative privilege:
69. 443 U.S. 111, 116 (1979). Senator Proxmire awarded the funders of
Hutchinson’s research his so-called “Golden Fleece of the Month” award for what
he perceived to be the most egregious example of wasteful governmental spending
that month. Id. at 114. Hutchinson was developing an objective measure of
aggression by studying how certain animals clench their jaws in response to
aggravating stimuli. Id. at 115.
70. Id. at 124.
71. Id. at 130. The Court came to this conclusion after surveying the existing
case law on the matter. E.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1973) (“A
Member of Congress may not with impunity publish a libel from the speaker’s
stand in his home district, and clearly the Speech or Debate Clause would not
protect such an act even though the libel was read from an official committee
report. The reason is that republishing a libel under such circumstances is not an
essential part of the legislative process and is not part of that deliberative process
‘by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings.’”); Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S 606, 625 (1972) (“[P]rivate publication by Senator Gravel .
. . was in no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate; nor does questioning
as to private publication threaten the integrity or independence of the Senate by
impermissibly exposing its deliberations to executive influence.”).
72. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 130.
73. Id.; see also 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 329 (1833)
(“Therefore, although a speech delivered in the house of commons is privileged,
and the member cannot be questioned respecting it elsewhere; yet, if he publishes
his speech, and it contains libelous matter, he is liable to an action and
prosecution therefor, as in common cases of libel.”).
74. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 132.
75. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871).
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that the truth can best be determined and justice can best be
76
served by encouraging maximum freedom of communication.
Again, it is important to note that this privilege was not created for
the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but
rather for the benefit of the public, whose interest is that judges be
at liberty to exercise their functions with independence, and
77
without fear of consequences.
Today, this privilege applies to nearly all participants in a
78
It is seen as indispensable to the public
judicial proceeding.
interest that attorneys, jurors, witnesses, parties, and judges be able
to speak freely and fearlessly, uninfluenced by the possibility of
79
being brought to account in an action for defamation.
3.

Executive Privilege

Absolute privilege was judicially extended to the executive
80
branch in the late nineteenth century. Relying on an analogy to
judicial privilege, the U.S. Supreme Court in Spalding v. Vilas held
that the head of a federal executive department was absolutely
privileged to make defamatory statements, as long as the comments
81
were made while acting within his official capacity.
Spalding, the Postmaster General, accused the plaintiff, a
82
While the words were
lawyer, of being a “common swindler.”
83
allegedly published with malicious intent, the Court granted
84
absolute privilege in a desire to best serve the public interest. The
Court concluded that “it would seriously cripple the proper and
76. Handler & Klein, supra note 3, at 55.
77. Bradley, 80 U.S at 349. Similarly to legislators, defamation suits against
judges might impinge upon their time at the public’s expense. Batchelder, Jr.,
supra note 56, at 392.
78. Handler & Klein, supra note 3, at 55; see also Veeder, supra note 66, at 474
(citing Dunham v. Powers, 42 Vt. 1 (1869)) (upholding privilege from liability for
a juror who, in the consultation room, asserted that the plaintiff was a liar and had
defrauded an insurance company).
79. Veeder, supra note 66, at 465. It is also thought that unsuccessful suits
against judges might constitute a serious drain on their time. Handler & Klein,
supra note 3, at 53.
80. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). For an informative history of the
development of executive privilege in England, see Arno C. Becht, The Absolute
Privilege of the Executive in Defamation, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1127, 1127–35 (1961–1962).
81. Spalding, 161 U.S. at 488–89.
82. Id. at 486.
83. Id. Because absolute privilege disposes of this case, it is never determined
whether or not actual malice was present. See Becht, supra note 80, at 1127–35.
84. Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498; see also Batchelder, Jr., supra note 56, at 393.
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effective administration of public affairs” if high-ranking executive
officials were subject to apprehension of liability for acts taken
85
Following the holding in
under the limits of their authority.
Spalding, states have extended executive privilege to high-ranking
state executive officials, such as the governor, the attorney general,
or the heads of state departments whose rank is the equivalent of
86
cabinet rank in the federal government.
C. Expanding the Scope of Privilege
Approximately sixty years after Spalding, in the landmark case
of Barr v. Matteo, the Supreme Court altered the legal landscape by
extending absolute privilege to low-level federal executive
87
In Barr, employees of the Federal Office of Rent
officials.
Stabilization sued the acting director for defamatory statements
contained in a press release, which criticized the employees’
actions in devising and implementing a budgetary plan that had
88
come under congressional attack.
The Court in Barr departed from the traditional rank-based
rule and greatly broadened the scope of immunized activity by
89
adopting a “functional approach” to determine immunity. The
Court concluded that privilege should not depend on the rank of
the government official, but rather on the duties involved in that
90
particular office. In making this analytical shift, the Court clearly
intended to extend the parameters of absolute privilege:
We do not think that the principle announced in
[Spalding v.] Vilas can properly be restricted to executive
officers of cabinet rank . . . . The privilege is not a badge
or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a
policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of
91
government.
In the fifty years since the Barr decision, “[L]ower federal courts
92
have extended immunity to public officials of virtually every rank.”
85. Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 591 cmt. c (1977).
87. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
88. Id. at 565–67.
89. Batchelder, Jr., supra note 56, at 393.
90. Barr, 360 U.S. at 573–74.
91. Id. at 572–73.
92. Batchelder, Jr., supra note 56, at 393 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367
(1983)) (NASA center director); see also Strothman v. Gefreh, 739 F.2d 515 (10th
Cir. 1984) (administrative law judges); George v. Kay, 632 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir.
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The modern trend in federal jurisdictions appears to favor free
93
speech over the rights of the defamed.
94
By the time Zutz v.
Many state courts have followed suit.
Nelson was decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 2010, the
majority of state jurisdictions were using this new functional
analysis to extend absolute privilege to individuals in lower-level
95
government positions. Within Minnesota, courts have repeatedly
faced the decision of whether to join this growing trend, or
maintain the “narrow limits” Minnesota has placed on absolute
96
privilege since it became a state.
D. Minnesota’s Minority Stance
For over a century, whether or not a government official in
Minnesota enjoyed absolute privilege depended on the rank of his
97
or her position. Because absolute privilege provides immunity to
those who make intentionally false and malicious statements,
1980) (postal inspector); Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc. v.
Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Smithsonian
department chairman); Mandel v. Nouse, 509 F.2d 1031 (6th Cir. 1975) (Army
commander); Sowders v. Damron, 457 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1972) (Internal
Revenue Service officers).
93. See sources cited supra note 92.
94. See, e.g., McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1966) (conforming to Saxon
v. Knowles, 185 So. 2d 194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)); Larson v. Donner, 178
N.E.2d 399 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961); Baker v. Couchman, 729 N.W.2d 520 (Mich.
2007); Bd. of Educ. v. Buffalo Council of Supervisors, 383 N.Y.S.2d 732 (N.Y.
1976); Catalina v. Crawford, 483 N.E.2d 486 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
95. Interestingly, authorities are inconsistent on which stance is, in fact, the
majority. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. c. (1977)
(recognizing that the majority of jurisdictions extend absolute privilege to
subordinate legislative bodies), with KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 114, at 821 (“A
scant majority have held that [subordinate legislative] proceedings are not within
the policy underlying the immunity, and that the members of such bodies are
sufficiently protected by a qualified privilege in the exercise of good faith.”)
(emphasis added), and 2 SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 8:25 (“The decisions appear to
be about evenly divided between those holding that an absolute privilege applies
to members of [subordinate legislative] bodies, and those holding that only a
qualified privilege applies.”). However, it is rather certain that the growing trend
is to expand immunity. See Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 69 n.1 (Minn. 2010)
(Anderson, Paul H., J., dissenting).
96. See, e.g., Johnson v. Dirkswager, 315 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Minn. 1982) (citing
Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 417 (1954)).
97. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 62; see, e.g., Bauer v. State, 511 N.W.2d 447, 450
(Minn. 1994) (declining to extend absolute privilege to mid-level state employees
acting in their official capacities); Jones v. Monico, 276 Minn. 371, 375, 150
N.W.2d 213, 215–16 (1967) (declining to extend absolute privilege to a member
of a county board).
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Minnesota has a history of confining this privilege within “narrow
98
Absolute privilege in Minnesota has been historically
limits.”
99
100
101
and executive
limited to high-ranking judicial, legislative,
officials.
The notion of extending absolute privilege to members of
subordinate government bodies—such as city councils, municipal
102
councils, and county boards —was first addressed in 1897, in
103
Wilcox v. Moore. In Wilcox, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused
104
Since
to extend absolute privilege to members of a city council.
then, Minnesota has consistently refused to extend absolute
privilege beyond high-ranking legislative, judicial, and executive
105
Minnesota courts have determined that members of
officials.
subordinate government bodies are sufficiently protected by
106
qualified privilege.
In 1994, the Minnesota Supreme Court departed from its
bright-line, rank-based rule and extended absolute privilege to
police officers for statements made in arrest reports in Carradine v.
98. Johnson, 315 N.W.2d at 220 (quoting Matthis, 243 Minn. at 223, 67 N.W.2d
at 417).
99. Matthis, 243 Minn. at 223–24, 67 N.W.2d at 417; accord RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 585 (1977).
100. See MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (granting absolute privilege to members of
the legislature); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. c, reporter’s note
(1981). The legislative privilege was extended in 1994 to the Regents of the
University of Minnesota by reason of separation of powers. Bd. of Regents of Univ.
of Minn. v. Reid, 522 N.W.2d 344, 348 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (“[T]his instance is
one in which the public’s right to know weighs more heavily [than a defamed
individual’s right to seek compensation].”).
101. Johnson, 315 N.W.2d at 223 (extending absolute privilege to “top-level
cabinet-type” executive officials). The U.S. Supreme Court extended absolute
privilege to high-level executive officials almost a century earlier in Spalding v.
Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498–99 (1896).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. c (1977).
103. 69 Minn. 49, 71 N.W. 917 (1897).
104. Id. at 52, 71 N.W. at 919. The defendants in Wilcox accused a judge of
activities “highly unbecoming a man.” Id. at 51, 71 N.W. at 918.
105. In 1909, the court denied absolute privilege to a city council member who
accused the plaintiff of “running nothing but a damn whorehouse.” Burch v.
Bernard, 107 Minn. 210, 211, 120 N.W. 33, 33 (1909). In 1967, in Jones v. Monico,
the Minnesota Supreme Court again held that subordinate government bodies,
such as municipal councils or town meetings, were not protected by absolute
privilege. 276 Minn. 371, 375–76, 150 N.W.2d 213, 216 (1967). Almost 100 years
after Wilcox, the court of appeals once more affirmed that Minnesota does not
extend absolute immunity to city council members. Johnson v. Northside
Residents Redevelopment Council, 467 N.W.2d 826, 830 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
106. Jones, 276 Minn. at 375, 150 N.W.2d at 216. This position places
Minnesota in the minority. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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State.
Police officers are not high-ranking executive officials,
but the court reasoned that any threat of defamation liability would
“deter the honest officer from fearlessly and vigorously preparing a
109
In Carradine, the court granted
detailed, accurate report . . . .”
absolute privilege because the policy of obtaining accurate police
reports outweighed the policy of protecting the arrestee from
110
potentially damaging defamatory statements.
Rather than treating police officers writing police reports as a
narrow exception to the established rule, the Carradine court
111
To
adopted a new two-factor analysis to justify its decision.
determine if absolute privilege was warranted, the court considered
(1) the nature of the function assigned to the officer; and (2) the
relationship of the statements to the performance of that
112
function.
This left the Minnesota Supreme Court with the following
dilemma: should Carradine be read broadly as creating a new rule
113
Or, should
to determine when absolute privilege applies?
Carradine be read as a narrow exception to the existing rank-based
114
rule, applicable only to police officers making arrest reports?
The answer would have to wait until Zutz v. Nelson, a case that
involved the potential extension of absolute immunity to watershed
107. 511 N.W.2d 733, 736–37 (Minn. 1994).
108. Id. at 735.
109. Id. at 736. This report is later used by the prosecutor to determine
whether to charge the arrestee and, if so, for what offense(s). Id. Therefore,
accurate arrest reports are essential to ensure justice for the accused. Id. at 735–
36. The report is also vital at trial, as it is used to refresh the officer’s memory and
possibly impeach the officer. Id. at 736. Additionally, threat of liability may cause
an officer to wait to bring up certain details until trial (under the judicial
privilege), and thus submit the accused to “trial by surprise.” Id.; see also Handler
& Klein, supra note 3, at 59 (“[I]t is sound policy to ‘protect the honest
communication of misinformation in order to insure the availability of correct
information . . . .’” (quoting 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF
TORTS § 5.25, at 437 (1956))).
110. Carradine, 511 N.W.2d at 736. The court in Carradine made clear that
should the police officer make statements beyond what was contained in the
report, only a qualified privilege would apply. Id. at 734; see also Redwood Cnty.
Tel. Co. v. Luttman, 567 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
absolute privilege applied to statements made by a sheriff).
111. Carradine, 511 N.W.2d at 736.
112. Id.
113. See Video of Oral Argument at 6:37, Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58 (Minn.
2010) (No. A08-1764) [hereinafter Oral Argument], available at
http://www.tpt.org/courts/MNJudicialBranchvideo_NEW.php?number=A081764.
(questioning from Justice Meyer regarding the scope of Carradine).
114. Id.
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115

III. THE ZUTZ DECISION
The four parties involved in this suit were board members of
the Middle Snake Tamarac Rivers Watershed District (hereinafter
116
Middle Snake Watershed District) in northern Minnesota.
Watershed districts are created by statute “[t]o conserve the natural
resources of the state by land use planning, flood control, and
117
These special-purpose units of
other conservation projects . . . .”
118
local government operate in a “quasi-legislative capacity” and are
given extensive authority, including the power of eminent
119
domain, to carry out their operations. Each watershed district in
Minnesota is operated by a board ranging from three to nine
120
managers, all appointed by the county commissioners of the
121
counties served by the watershed district.
Two members of the Middle Snake Watershed District Board,
Loren Zutz and Elden Elseth, suspected improprieties regarding
122
payments to various district employees. Zutz and Elseth obtained
123
the district’s bank records to further investigate the matter.
At a board meeting on June 18, 2007, John Nelson and Arlyn
Stroble, two other board members, believed Zutz and Elseth’s
investigation violated the Minnesota Government Data Practices
124
125
First, in
Act and allegedly made statements to that effect.
115. 788 N.W.2d at 59–60.
116. Id. at 60.
117. MINN. STAT. § 103D.201, subdiv. 1 (2010). Watershed boards carry out
specific purposes, such as, inter alia, controlling flood waters, diverting
watercourses, regulating the use of ditches and watercourses, and regulating
improvements by riparian property owners. MINN. STAT. § 103D.201, subdiv. 2
(2010).
118. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 60.
119. MINN. STAT. § 103D.335, subdivs. 1(3), 11 (2010).
120. Id. § 103D.205, subdiv. 2(b) (2010); Id. § 103D.225, subdiv. 4(a) (2010)
(“The number of managers may not be less than three nor more than nine, except
that a proposed watershed district entirely within the metropolitan area may not
have fewer than five managers.”). Board members serve three-year terms. Id. §
103D.315, subdiv. 6 (2010).
121. MINN. STAT. § 103D.311, subdiv. 2 (2010).
122. Brief of Appellants at 2, Zutz, 788 N.W.2d 58 (No. A08-1764). Watershed
District boards have authority to hire employees to facilitate “the works and
improvements undertaken by the district.” MINN. STAT. § 103D.325, subdiv. 3
(2010).
123. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 60.
124. MINN. STAT. § 13.43 (2010). For a discussion of the Minnesota
Government Data Practices Act and the type of information to which the public
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response to a question about whether Zutz and Elseth had violated
Minnesota law, Nelson allegedly stated, “I don’t think there is
126
Nelson also allegedly stated,
much question that [they] did.”
127
“Laws are being broken by Board Members—enough is enough!”
Finally, Stroble, implying that Zutz and Elseth violated Minnesota
law, allegedly asked, “Why should we provide legal counsel for
128
After these accusations, a
actions that are against the law?”
129
“lengthy and heated discussion” ensued.
Zutz and Elseth then brought an action against Nelson and
130
Nelson and Stroble raised absolute
Stroble for defamation.
privilege as an affirmative defense and moved for judgment on the
131
The district court granted the motion, holding that
pleadings.
Nelson and Stroble enjoyed absolute privilege from defamation
132
claims, and the complaint was dismissed.
Zutz and Elseth appealed on the grounds that Minnesota law
does not grant absolute privilege to subordinate bodies such as
133
However, relying primarily on the
watershed district boards.
134
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Carradine v. State, the
court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling, reasoning that
the public interest is best served by “open, frank communication
135
from district board members.”
136
The
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.
court declined to read Carradine as a new way of analyzing absolute
137
Instead, the court saw Carradine as supporting the
privilege.
traditional rule in Minnesota: that absolute immunity is only
has access, see Paul R. Hannah, Minnesota Data Practices Act, in MINNESOTA
INSTITUTE OF LEGAL EDUCATION, MEDIA LAW: DEFAMATION/GOVERNMENT DATA AND
RELATED ISSUES 1 (1995).
125. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 61.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Watershed District Board Meeting Minutes, 3 (June 18, 2007)
[hereinafter Meeting Minutes], available at http://www.mstrwd.com/wpcontent/uploads/07-06r2.min_2.DOC.
130. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 61. The meeting, which commenced at 7:00 p.m., did
not adjourn until approximately 12:48 a.m. Meeting Minutes, supra note 129, at 8.
131. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 61.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 511 N.W.2d 733, 735–36 (Minn. 1994).
135. Zutz v. Nelson, No. A08-1764, 2009 WL 1752139, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 16, 2009).
136. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 66.
137. Id. at 63.
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granted to high-ranking officials, and any extension beyond highranking government officials is treated as an exception to the rule,
138
Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme
based on public policy.
Court concluded that limiting watershed district board members to
139
qualified immunity “better serves the people of Minnesota.”
The court provided three main reasons for this conclusion.
First, extending absolute privilege is not—and should not be—
140
done lightly, as it provides immunity for potentially devastating
141
142
Second, the
defamatory speech without adequate recourse.
court concluded that members of these bodies are sufficiently
143
Third, the court found that the
protected by qualified privilege.
defendants did not produce a sufficiently compelling reason to
144
overrule long-standing Minnesota precedent.
The case law in Minnesota, while perhaps not a model of
145
clarity, is relatively consistent in refusing to extend absolute
146
immunity to subordinate government bodies. Holding otherwise
147
would mark a departure from Minnesota’s stance on the issue.
148
Ultimately, the court—in spite of the dissent’s urging —refused to
149
Watershed district board members enjoy a
make the shift.
qualified, not absolute, privilege to make defamatory statements in

138. Id. at 65–66 (citing Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d
413, 417 (1954)).
139. Id. at 63. During oral argument, Justice Dietzen expressed concern that
the unintended consequences of broadly extending absolute privilege were not
sufficiently considered by the lower courts. Oral Argument, supra note 113, at
16:32.
140. Oral Argument, supra note 113, at 29:15 (questioning from Chief Justice
Gildea); cf. Burch v. Bernard, 107 Minn. 210, 211–12, 120 N.W. 33, 34 (1909)
(declining to extend absolute privilege to a city council member).
141. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 62. “[D]efamatory speech . . . can be personally
crushing and career-ending.” Id. at 64.
142. Id. at 65; see also infra text accompanying notes 162–66.
143. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 62–63 (citing Jones v. Monico, 276 Minn. 371, 375,
150 N.W.2d 213, 216 (1967)).
144. Id. at 64. Overruling Minnesota precedent requires a “compelling
reason” to do so. State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Minn. 2009) (quoting State
v. Lee, 706 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 2005)).
145. See Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 63 n.2 (admitting the presence of confusing
statements in Minnesota common law).
146. Id. at 63; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. c, reporter’s
note (1977).
147. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 63.
148. Id. at 73 (Anderson, Paul H., J., dissenting) (“[A] change in Minnesota’s
law regarding absolute legislative privilege should be made in this case.”).
149. Id. at 66 (majority opinion).
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150

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ZUTZ DECISION
The Minnesota Supreme Court confirmed Minnesota’s place
in the minority by deciding that qualified, not absolute, privilege
151
This Part first
applies to members of watershed district boards.
discusses how the Zutz ruling strikes a better balance between the
competing policies of free, uninhibited speech and providing relief
to victims of intentionally malicious defamatory statements when it
152
comes to subordinate government officials. It then discusses how
Zutz provides a more certain, and thus preferable, test in
153
determining the applicability of absolute or qualified privilege.
A. The Zutz Rule Strikes a Better Balance Between Competing Interests
Extending absolute privilege to essentially all levels of
government without limit strikes the wrong balance between the
competing interest of free, uninhibited debate and the often
irreparable damage caused by leaving victims of unbridled
defamatory statements without an adequate opportunity for
154
Cases granting such extension generally fail to fully
redress.
155
explore the complete ramifications of expanding immunity.
This section first discusses why absolute privilege is not
156
It then
appropriate for subordinate government officials.
discusses why these subordinate officials are sufficiently protected
157
by qualified privilege.

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See infra Part IV.A.
153. See infra Part IV.B.
154. See Zutz, 788 N.W.2d. at 65; see also Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 585
(1959) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the modern rule “can only have
the added effect of deterring the desirable public discussion of all aspects of our
Government and the conduct of its officials”); ELDER, supra note 40, § 2:13
(explaining that the expansion of absolute privilege has been “criticized . . . by
most legal commentators”). But see Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.
1949) (“[I]t has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs
done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the
constant dread of retaliation.”).
155. See Barr, 360 U.S. at 578 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Oral Argument, supra
note 113, at 16:32.
156. See infra Part IV.A.1.
157. See infra Part IV.A.2.
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1. Absolute Privilege is Not Appropriate for Subordinate Government
Officials
There are three primary reasons why absolute privilege is not
appropriate for unelected, volunteer watershed district board
members. First, these officials are not directly accountable to the
158
public in the way high-level elected officials are.
Elected
members of Congress play a unique role in the effective
159
Senators and
functioning of a democratic government.
Representatives are sent by their constituents to represent the
160
While these legislators are given
collective will of the people.
absolute privilege to participate in free, uninhibited speech and
debate, they are also subject to the checks and balances of the
voters who guard against abuse of power by retaining the ability to
161
vote these members out of office.
Because absolute privilege deprives individuals of a remedy for
wrongdoing, “[it] should be bestowed only when and at the level
162
A key element to consider in determining whether
necessary.”
absolute immunity strikes the right balance is the availability of
163
Even if an official
alternate remedies for victims of defamation.
with absolute privilege cannot be sued, victims of defamation—or
citizens who believe the official is abusing his or her privilege—can
obtain adequate redress by voting that person out of office.
However, citizens who disapprove of the actions of watershed
164
district boards cannot vote those members out of office. Nor can
these citizens necessarily vote out of office those who appointed
158. See Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 64–65.
159. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives.”).
160. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404–05 (1819) (“The government
of the Union, then . . . is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In
form, and in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them,
and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.”).
161. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 926.
162. Chamberlain v. Mathis, 729 P.2d 905, 912 (Ariz. 1986) (quoting Grimm v.
Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227, 1232 (Ariz. 1977)).
163. See Recent Cases, 37 MINN. L. REV. 139, 142 (1952–1953); see also Freier v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 197, 356 N.W.2d 724, 733 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (expanding
absolute privilege to school board members in decisions to discharge teachers was
justified, in part, because of the adequate remedies of judicial review and
reinstatement with back pay available to potentially defamed teachers). Veeder,
supra note 66, at 470–71 (discussing various alternate remedies for victims of
privileged defamation and their importance).
164. Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 2010).
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165

these board members. The majority in Zutz appropriately rejects
the dissent’s argument that “public scrutiny and criticism”
sufficiently hold such subordinate government officials
166
accountable.
Second, if all government officials could make blatantly false,
defamatory statements without inhibition, members of the general
public may hesitate to voice opinions about these officials for fear
167
Imagine, for example, that
of an unrestrained counterattack.
168
A
zoning board members enjoyed absolute privilege to defame.
citizen making an appeal to the board might hesitate before
speaking, to prevent an unrestrained counterattack to his
169
While public policy favors high-level members of the
character.
executive branch, legislature, and judiciary enjoying the fullest
170
liberty of speech, unelected, volunteer members of a watershed
171
district board ought not to enjoy such unbridled liberty.
Finally, Minnesota already imposes various limitations on one’s
ability to recover for defamation, making it relatively difficult to
172
Therefore, subordinate
recover for defamation in Minnesota.
governmental officials already enjoy substantial security from
173
As such, additional protection for government
defamation suits.
officials in Minnesota is unnecessary.

165. Id. at 64–65.
166. Id. at 65.
167. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 585 (1959) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Warren believed such an expansion would wrongly serve to “sanctify the
powerful and silence debate.” Id.; see also Bruce Jones, Qualified Immunity for Federal
Officials: A Proposed Standard for Defamation Cases, 58 TEX. L. REV. 789, 797–98
(1980) (discussing the negative ramifications of absolute privilege).
168. See Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 65.
169. See id.
170. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 72 (Anderson, Paul H., J., dissenting) (citing 2 WORKS
OF JAMES WILSON 38 (James De Witt Andrews ed., 1896)).
171. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 65.
172. See, e.g., Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn.
1996) (holding that damages for emotional distress “are not compensable absent
[proof of actual] harm to reputation”); see also Longbehn v. Schoenrock, 727
N.W.2d 153, 160–62 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing the requirements for
special damages, general damages, and punitive damages in a defamation claim).
173. See Richie, 544 N.W.2d at 28.
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2. Subordinate Government Officials Are Sufficiently Protected by
Qualified Privilege
Uninhibited speech promotes the discovery of truth and the
174
maintenance of an effective democracy.
However, the
consequences of providing unelected citizens absolute freedom of
speech ought to be examined more closely before absolute
175
The notion that absolute privilege is
privilege is extended.
essential at all levels of government for effective democracy
“manifest[s] an unfortunate tendency to be mesmerized by
resounding phrases and to ignore the fallibility of a priori notions
176
The Zutz court debunked the
about psychological phenomena.”
popular notion that nothing less than absolute privilege is
sufficient to ensure the free flow of information in subordinate
177
legislative proceedings. Considering the two competing interests
178
179
at stake, many courts and commentators have concluded that
lower-level government officials are sufficiently protected by
qualified privilege.
Qualified privilege allows subordinate government officials to
vigorously carry out their official duties without entirely eliminating
protection against intentionally false statements made with

174. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 926.
175. See Handler & Klein, supra note 3, at 50 n.24; see also Laura Oren,
Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U. PITT. L.
REV. 935, 984 n.204 (1989) (“In other contexts courts have found that similarly
dire predictions [of the consequences of qualified privilege] were not borne out
by events.”).
176. Handler & Klein, supra note 3, at 50 n.24.
177. See id. at 52.
178. E.g., Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Minn. 2010); Jones v. Monico,
276 Minn. 371, 375, 150 N.W.2d 213, 216 (1967); Johnson v. Northside Residents
Redevelopment Council, 467 N.W.2d 826, 828 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); see also
Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1460–61 (4th Cir. 1996) (Michael,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the public should be protected against false and
malicious publication); Aspen Exploration Corp. v. Sheffield, 739 P.2d 150, 157–
62 (Alaska 1987); Browning v. Birmingham News, 348 So. 2d 455, 458 (Ala. 1977);
Chamberlain v. Mathis, 729 P.2d 905, 910–14 (Ariz. 1986); Williams v. Fischer, 581
N.E.2d 744, 745–46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (Chapman, J., concurring); Lanier v.
Higgins, 623 S.W.2d 914, 915–16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Stukuls v. State, 366 N.E.2d
829, 833 (N.Y. 1977).
179. ELDER, supra note 40, § 2:13 n.17 (citing L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF
DEFAMATION 397–402 (1978)); KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 114, at 822–23;
Absolute Immunity, supra note 8, at 594 (“[Qualified privilege] would insure that
public officials would not use their offices for personal vendettas or in bad faith . .
. .”).
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180

malice.
Subordinate government officials are protected against
the consequences of honest mistakes, but will be held liable for
comments made “from ill will and improper motives, or causelessly
181
and wantonly for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff.”
Furthermore, qualified privilege can be lost if statements are not
182
made in furtherance of the purpose that the privilege protects or
183
As such, the fear of an unrestrained
if the privilege is abused.
counterattack is diminished, and citizens will be more apt to speak
184
When it comes to subordinate
out against subordinate officials.
government officials, qualified privilege strikes the appropriate
balance between promoting free, uninhibited speech and
providing a mechanism for direct accountability to the citizens they
serve.
Proponents of extending absolute immunity claim that
exposing subordinate government officials to potential litigation
will have a chilling effect on the free and open debate required to
185
However, this statement is “an
serve the public interest.
exceedingly questionable assumption for which there is little or no
186
Since Minnesota became a state,
empirical or other support.”
subordinate government officials have enjoyed qualified, rather
187
There is no evidence that a lack of
than absolute, privilege.
180. See Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 564, 586 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 66; Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 222–23, 67 N.W.2d
413, 416 (1954).
181. Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 920 (Minn. 2009) (quoting
Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980)).
182. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 115, at 834.
183. See supra note 15.
184. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 584–85 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Warren believed such an expansion would wrongly serve to “sanctify the
powerful and silence debate.” Id. at 585; see also Jones, supra note 167, at 797–98
(discussing the negative ramifications of absolute privilege).
185. Barr, 360 U.S. at 575 (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377
(1951)); see also Barr 360 U.S. at 577 (Black, J., concurring); Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). But see Howard, 360 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]t is stretching the argument pretty far to say that the mere inquiry
into malice would have worse consequences than the possibility of actual malice
(which we would not, for a minute, condone).”).
186. ELDER, supra note 1540, § 2:13 (footnote omitted); see also Howard, 360
U.S. at 590 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (declaring this assumption a “gossamer web
self-spun without a scintilla of support to which one can point”); Handler & Klein,
supra note 3, at 48 (pointing to the Court’s minimal analysis of why government
officials should be afforded absolute privilege).
187. See, e.g., Burch v. Bernard, 107 Minn. 210, 211, 120 N.W. 33, 34 (1909)
(providing that a subordinate government official may enjoy immunity from
statements made in the course of their employment, but statements not made in
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absolute privilege has hindered zoning boards, city councils, or
188
watershed district boards from executing their duties with vigor.
It is simply injudicious to establish a rule that eliminates both the
availability of compensation to victims of defamation and the
deterrent to public officials from making knowingly false and
189
malicious statements on such speculative grounds.
Proponents of extending privilege also claim that absolute
privilege is necessary to ensure that public officials are able to
devote their full time and attention to the responsibilities of their
190
However, this fear is
office without being tied up in litigation.
mitigated by the fact that qualified privilege places the difficult
191
Also, as discussed in
burden of proving malice on the plaintiff.
192
the next section, the Carradine rule actually increases the amount
of litigation involving public officials due to its post-hoc factor
193
analysis, as opposed to a bright-line rule.
Ultimately, courts must determine whether an extension of
privilege is warranted by balancing “the public interest in free
exchange of information . . . and the individual rights of people
who might be defamed by unscrupulous participants in that
194
For the reasons stated above, Zutz sets out a better,
process.”
195
more balanced rule.
B. The Zutz Rule Provides Certainty
A bright-line, rank-based rule with narrow exceptions is better
than the case-by-case, post-hoc factor analysis set forth in

good faith or an honest belief enjoy no such immunity); Lowry v. Vedder, 40
Minn. 475, 475, 42 N.W 542, 542 (1889) (stating that a communication made with
malice is not entitled to immunity).
188. See Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 2010); Chamberlain v. Mathis,
729 P.2d 905, 912 (Ariz. 1986).
189. See Chamberlain, 729 P.2d at 912.
190. Defamation, supra note 57, at 918.
191. 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 111 (2011).
192. See infra Part IV.B.
193. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 369 U.S. 564, 571 (1959).
194. Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 70 (Minn. 2010) (Anderson, Paul H., J.,
dissenting).
195. See id. at 66 (“The people of Minnesota are better served by the
application of a qualified, rather than absolute, privilege to members of watershed
district boards.”); accord Lanier v. Higgins, 623 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981)
(discussing the competing interests of the public that officials act both responsibly
and vigorously); ELDER, supra note 40, § 2:13 (criticizing the liberal trend to
broadly extend absolute immunity when qualified immunity is adequate).
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196

Carradine.
The Zutz rule provides certainty to government
officials to know in advance whether they enjoy absolute immunity
to make defamatory statements, or if they must act in good faith
197
In contrast, the
and without malice in the course of their duty.
Carradine rule requires a de novo evaluation of nearly every
defamation suit involving a government official to determine if
198
absolute privilege exists for the particular position and duty.
Ironically, as stated supra, this creates the very increase in litigation
199
proponents are seeking to avoid.
One—perhaps unforeseen—consequence of adopting a
Carradine-like rule is that it creates a de facto “presumption that the
challenged action is within the officer’s scope of duty unless the
200
All that typically exists in the
plaintiff can prove otherwise.”
record are mere “assertions that a specific official has the power to
201
As admitted by the
do what resulted in the defamation.”
dissenting opinion in Barr, rarely are functions of an official
202
This has the effect of
position specifically enumerated.
improperly shifting the burden of proof onto the plaintiff to prove
that absolute privilege does not apply, rather than the defendant
203
having to establish that absolute privilege does apply.
Therefore, the Zutz rule not only provides government officials
with a clear rule in determining whether or not one enjoys absolute
privilege, but also limits litigation by avoiding the post hoc factor
analysis required with the Carradine test.

196. See Barr, 360 U.S. at 578–79 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). But see id. at 573–
74 (majority opinion). The majority in Barr rejected the rank test, stating that
analysis should instead focus on “the duties with which the particular officer . . . is
entrusted” to determine whether or not to expand immunity. Id.
197. See id. at 578 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 578–79.
199. See, e.g., id. at 571.
200. See id. at 579.
201. Id. In Barr, for example, in response to the defendant’s assertion that the
press release was authorized by his position, the court concluded, “we cannot say
that it was not an appropriate exercise of the discretion with which an executive
officer of petitioner’s rank is necessarily clothed.” Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
202. See id. at 579 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
203. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 613 cmt. f (1938); KEETON ET
AL., supra note 15, § 111, at 772; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 629 and cases cited (2d ed. 1955).
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V. CONCLUSION
By the time Zutz was decided in 2010, a growing number of
jurisdictions were extending absolute privilege to lower-level
204
government positions.
The Minnesota Supreme Court had to
decide whether to join this trend or maintain the “narrow limits”
Minnesota has placed on absolute privilege since it became a
205
state.
Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly
maintained that while high-ranking legislators ought to “enjoy the
206
providing unelected citizens such
fullest liberty of speech,”
unbridled liberty strikes the wrong balance between the competing
207
When it comes to subordinate government
policies at stake.
officials in Minnesota, qualified privilege provides adequate
208
protection to all interests involved.

204. See supra note 95.
205. Compare Johnson v. Dirkswager, 315 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Minn. 1982)
(holding that a top-level cabinet-like official enjoys absolute immunity, even from
communicating defamatory material), with Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219,
223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 417 (1954) (stating that the recognized class of occasions
where the publication of defamatory material is absolutely privileged is confined
within “narrow limits”).
206. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951).
207. See Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 64–66 (Minn. 2010).
208. See id.
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